Soviet Aims In Central America

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Using Nicaragua as a case study, this book demonstrates how Soviet foreign policy has been the instrument for projecting MoscoW's power and influence in a region that has been in the U.S. sphere of influences since 1898. Soviet Aims in Central America lays down the facts about the Soviets' drive since the 1950s to undermine U.S. influence in Central America by fueling guerrilla wars.

G. W. Sand examines key Sandinista, Castroite, and Guatemalan Communist documents and reveals how Soviet military power is being used by the Sandinistas and their Cuban allies to consolidate power, threaten Nicaragua's neighbors, and ultimately revolutionize all of Central America. This, Sand claims, threatens the future of the United States itself.

The foreword by former ambassador to Costa Rica, Lewis A. Tambs, chillingly describes the unprecedented threat to U.S. security by Soviet satellization of Central American countries. Sand begins the book with a detailed review of Soviet aims and strategies in the Americas. The book offers a history of the Sandinista movement as well as Soviet foreign policy toward Nicaragua.

Further chapters explore the Sandinistas' record with regard to human rights and the current civil war in Nicaragua. Sand's detailed reading of Central American Communist documents reveals Soviet aims for the region. Finally, the book offers a possible strategy for averting MoscoW's incursion into the United States' sphere of influence.

Students of political science and scholars of Central America, or anyone interested in this volatile region, will find Soviet Aims in Central America provocative reading. Review: ?Sand begins by pointing out that there is no mistaking Moscow's hostile aims in those areas of the Third World where a small military and economic investment produces problems for the West.

Fortunately, he then goes on to make this point without the conspiratorial obsessions and superficial analyses into which some anti-communist authors fall. . . . Sand points out the importance of the response or lack of response offered by democratic or other noncommunist societies. He makes the interesting argument that the outcomes of revolutionary insurgencies depend to a large extent on the mistakes made by noncommunist governments, and cites as an instance those of the Carter administration and the Mexican government in dealing with the Sandanistas.

Nor does the author underestimate the potential of relatively smaller communist states, such as Nicaragua under the Sandinastas, to contribute to the threat against their immediate neighbors.?-ORBIS