Description
The audacious Tet Offensive of 1968 ended with an American military victory, yet Tet is remembered as the juncture when American support turned against the war. Public opinion on the war was a primary concern for the Johnson Administration in 1967, and US intelligence played a decisive role in providing an overly optimistic view of the enemy's demise. With revised estimates of the enemy's numbers provided by military intelligence and an optimistic National Intelligence Estimate from the CIA, General William Childs Westmoreland was able to tell the National Press Club in November 1967 that the enemy was "bankrupt." Yet only two months later, in January of 1968, the "bankrupt" enemy attacked with a ferocity and intensity that shocked the American public. Intelligence had set-up the American public for a fall. How, Americans wanted to know, could an enemy whose numbers had been so decimated now launch such an all-out offensive?
This book examines intelligence's role in shaping America's perception of the war and looks closely at the intelligence leadership and decision process in Vietnam. From this examination and an understanding of how the enemy viewed itself, the conclusion is made that four severe breaches of intelligence etiquette occurred during the period leading up to Tet.
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